Community Property—Characterization of the Inflationary Increase in the Value of Separate Property Improved by Community Funds—In re Marriage of Elam, 97 Wn. 2d 811, 650 P.2d 213 (1982) by Wallin, Elizabeth Lacalli
Washington Law Review 
Volume 59 Number 2 
4-1-1984 
Community Property—Characterization of the Inflationary 
Increase in the Value of Separate Property Improved by 
Community Funds—In re Marriage of Elam, 97 Wn. 2d 811, 650 
P.2d 213 (1982) 
Elizabeth Lacalli Wallin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Family Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Elizabeth L. Wallin, Recent Developments, Community Property—Characterization of the Inflationary 
Increase in the Value of Separate Property Improved by Community Funds—In re Marriage of Elam, 97 Wn. 
2d 811, 650 P.2d 213 (1982), 59 Wash. L. Rev. 341 (1984). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol59/iss2/6 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY-CHARACTERIZATION OF THE
INFLATIONARY INCREASE IN THE VALUE OF SEPARATE
PROPERTY IMPROVED BY COMMUNITY FUNDS-In re Mar-
riage of Elam, 97 Wn. 2d 811, 650 P.2d 213 (1982).
Stanley and Norma Elam were married in April 1972. Mrs. Elam
brought into the marriage, as part of her separate property, a home pur-
chased prior to the marriage. I At the time of marriage, its estimated value
was $15,000.2 In October 1979, at dissolution of the marriage, it was
worth $34,000. 3
During the marriage, $5,500 of community funds and labor 4 was con-
tributed to improve the home. In addition, the home's value increased
$13,500 due to inflation. 5 The trial court characterized the home as Mrs.
Elam's separate property and, erroneously valuing the community contri-
bution at $9,000, awarded Mr. Elam $5,000 as his interest in the commu-
nity contribution. 6 He was not given a share of the inflationary increase in
the value of the property.
Mr. Elam appealed this award, arguing that the entire increase in the
value of the house was community property absent evidence tracing the
increase entirely to inflation, or to contributions from Mrs. Elam's sepa-
rate estate. 7 The Washington Court of Appeals certified to the Washing-
ton Supreme Court the issue of whether there is any community interest in
the inflationary increase in the value of separate property when commu-
nity funds and labor have been used to improve it. 8
The Washington Supreme Court held that: (1) the increase in value of
separate property is presumptively separate, unless the community claim-
ant rebuts the presumption by direct and positive proof that community
contributions caused the increase, 9 and (2) the community is entitled to a
I. In re Marriage of Elam, 97Wn. 2d811, 812, 650 P.2d 213, 214 (1982).
2. Id. at 817, 650 P.2d at 216. The house cost Mrs. Elam $7,500 in 1967. Id. at 812, 650 P.2d at
214. Prenuptial contributions of $3,500 were made by Mr. Elam. Id. at 813, 650 P.2d at 214. Mr.
Elam testified at trial that these contributions effectively doubled the value of the house. Id. at 817,
650 P.2d at 216.
3. Id. at 812,650 P.2d at 214.
4. Id. at 813, 650 P.2d at 214. The trial court erroneously valued the postnuptial contributions at
$9,000. Of this amount, $3,500 had been contributed by Mr. Elam prior to marriage, making the
amount of community contributions $5,500. Id.
5. See id. at 817, 650 P.2d at 216.
6. Id. at 812, 650 P.2d at 214.
7. Id. at 813, 650 P.2d at 214.
8. Id. at 812, 650 P.2d at 214.
9. Id. at 816-17, 650 P.2d at 216.
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share of the inflationary increase in the value of the separate property pro-
portionate to the community contributions. 10
The Elam court's first holding, that the increase in value of separate
property is presumptively separate, is in accord with prior Washington
law. However, the court's second holding, that the community is entitled
to a share of the inflationary increase in the value of the separate property,
is not. Under relevant Washington case law the community has not been
entitled to any of the inflationary increase in the value of separate prop-
erty. Such inflationary increase attaches to the separate property itself.
The court's holding changes Washington law, threatens the continuity of
the reimbursement theory, 1  and makes future characterization of in-
flationary increases uncertain. 12
10. Id. at 817, 650 P.2d at 216. On the basis of these holdings, the court recalculated the amount
of Mr. Elam's award as $4,559. Id. The court used a two-step process-$2750 was calculated as Mr.
Elam's share in the community contribution, and the remaining $1809 was his pro rata share in the
inflationary increase in the value of the property:
a. Community contribution 5,500
Mr. Elam's share (50%) x.50 2,750
b. Value of house at marriage 15,000
Community contributions 5,500
Value of house at dissolution 20,500
without inflation
Mr. Elam's share (2,750) = 13.4% of 20,500.
Total value of house at dissolution 34,000
Less value without inflation 20,500
Inflationary increase 13,500
Mr. Elam's share (13.4%) x.134 1,809
Mr. Elam's entire share 4,559
The supreme court found that the trial court's award of $5,000 was fair and equitable, and that
there was sufficient evidence before the trial court for it to have reached that result within the princi-
ples articulated by the supreme court. Consequently, the court affirmed the $5,000 award and granted
Mr. Elam an equitable lien on Mrs. Elam's house for that amount. Id.
I1. "Reimbursement theory," as used in this Note, refers to the method by which Washington
courts reimburse the separate and community estates at the dissolution of a marriage for contributions
made by these estates to each other during the marriage. Under Washington reimbursement theory,
when assets of one estate are contributed to improve the property of another marital estate, the con-
tributing estate does not acquire any ownership interest in the improved property, but rather has an
equitable right to be reimbursed for the contribution. See infra Parts IA & lB.
12. This Note is limited in scope to the situation where one spouse uses community funds to
improve the other's separate property. It does not consider those situations in which community funds
are used by one spouse to improve his or her own property, separate funds are used to improve
community property, or separate funds of one spouse are used to improve the separate property of the
other.
Improvement of Separate Property by Community Funds
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Right to Reimbursement
Under Washington community property law, the character of property
becomes fixed at the date of its acquisition. 13 Property acquired by a
spouse prior to marriage, or acquired during marriage by "gift, bequest,
devise, or descent," is the separate property of the acquiring spouse. 14
The "rents, issues and profits" of separate property are also separate. 15
All property acquired otherwise during marriage is community prop-
erty. 16 Thus, there are three types of property that may be owned during
marriage: the wife's separate property, the husband's separate property,
and community property.
Once the status of property is fixed, it will retain its character unless it
is changed by agreement of the parties, by deed, by estoppel, or by due
process of law. 17 Separate property is presumed to continue as separate
property through its changes and value fluctuations until it can no longer
be traced, or until the presumption is overcome by evidence to the con-
trary.18 Thus, if assets of a different character are used to improve the
property, the character of the property will remain unchanged and title to
the improvement will follow title to the improved asset. 19 The contribu-
ting estate does not have an ownership interest in the improved prop-
erty. 20 Rather, the improvement may give rise to a right of reimbursement
on behalf of the contributing estate, secured by an equitable lien on the
improved asset. 21
13. Baker v. Baker, 80 Wn. 2d 736, 745, 498 P.2d 315, 320 (1972); In re Witte's Estate, 21
Wn. 2d 112, 124, 150 P.2d 595, 601 (1944); Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn. 2d 355, 360, 110 P.2d 172, 174
(1941); In re Marriage of Harshman, 18 Wn. App. 116, 122, 567 P.2d 667, 671 (1977).
14. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010, .020 (1983).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 26.16.030 (1983). There is a presumption that all property acquired by purchase during
a marriage is community property. In re Witte's Estate, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 125, 150 P.2d 595, 601
(1944); Yesler v. Hochstettler, 4 Wash. 349, 353, 30 P. 398,399 (1892).
17. In re Witte's Estate, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 125, 150 P.2d 595, 601 (1944); Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn.
2d 355, 360, 110 P.2d 172, 174 (1941).
18. State exrel. Van Moss v. Sailors, 180 Wash. 269, 274, 39 P.2d 397, 399 (1934); see also In
re Witte's Estate, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 125, 150 P.2d 595, 601 (1944); Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash. 340,
352, 115 P. 731,735 (1911).
19. Leroux v. Knoll, 28 Wn. 2d 964, 968, 184 P.2d 564, 566 (1947); Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn. 2d
355, 362, 110 P.2d 172, 175 (1941); Merrit v. Newkirk, 155 Wash. 517, 522, 285 P. 442, 444
(1930). This rule is termed the "fixtures doctrine." W. REPpy & C. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY
IN THE UNTrrED STATES 106 (2d ed. 1982). Under the doctrine, the contributing estate has a right to
reimbursement, but the improved estate has title to the improvement.
20. Merrit v. Newkirk, 155 Wash. 517,522,285 P. 442,444 (1930).
21. Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn. 2d 355, 362, 110 P.2d 172, 175 (1941). Professor Bartke character-
izes the lien as a "true equitable lien which attaches pro tanto as the improvements are made."
Bartke, Yours, Mine and Ours-Separate Title and Community Funds, 44 WASH. L. REv. 379, 398
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Because the right to reimbursement is an equitable right, it will not
arise in every situation. 22 The contribution may have been intended as a
gift to the benefited estate, creating no need for reimbursement. 23 The
fight also may be offset if the contributing estate derives a comparable
benefit from using the enhanced property.2 4 Additionally, no fight to re-
imbursement will arise if the evidence is insufficient to ascertain the ex-
tent of a community contribution. 25
B. Measure of Recovery
Washington courts have not clearly defined the proper measure of the
fight to reimbursement. In some cases the right to reimbursement has
(1969). Professor Cross, on the other hand, concludes that there is the traditional right to reimburse-
ment protected by an equitable lien to assure payment of the debt. Cross, The Community Property
Law in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REv. 729, 776 (1974). A right to reimbursement was first recog-
nized on behalf of a marital community in Legg v. Legg, 34 Wash. 132, 140, 75 P. 130, 132-33
(1904). Such a right was secured by an equitable lien in Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn. 2d 355, 110 P.2d 172
(1941). In Conley, community funds had been used to build a home on the husband's separate prop-
erty, "greatly enhanc[ing] the value of the property." Id. at 362, 110 P.2d at 175. The court held that
the community had acquired an interest in the separate property in the form of an equitable lien
against it. The court allowed the marital community's trustee in bankruptcy to enforce the lien on
behalf of the community's creditors. Id.
A right to reimbursement has similarly been recognized on behalf of a separate estate, where the
separate property of one spouse was used to improve the property of the other. In re Estate of Tri-
erweiler, 5 Wn. App. 17, 486 P.2d 314 (1971). It has been noted that "the lien should arise when-
ever property of one of the three characters (separate property of the husband, separate property of the
wife, or community property) is used to improve property of either of the two other sorts." Id. at 22,
486 P.2d at 318. See also Cross, supra, at 777.
The same reimbursement situation may also arise with respect to payment on a mortgage obliga-
tion, Merkel v. Merkel, 39 Wn. 2d 102, 114, 234 P.2d 857, 863 (1951), or on an installment pur-
chase contract, Farrow v. Ostrom, 16 Wn. 2d 547,555-56, 133 P.2d 974,977-78 (1943), made with
assets of a different character than the encumbered property. The contributing estate gains no owner-
ship interest. At most it has been entitled to reimbursement secured by an equitable lien on the en-
hanced asset. Merkel, 39 Wn. 2d at 114, 234 P.2d at 863.
22. "The right to reimbursement is undoubtedly predicated upon equitable considerations. Thus
the facts surrounding the contributions must be evaluated to determine where the equities lie and
whether the right to reimbursement will arise." Cross, supra note 21, at 776-77.
23. According to Professor Cross, if community funds are used by a spouse to improve his or her
own separate property, a gift will not be found, and the right to reimbursement will arise to protect
the community. If, however, a spouse uses community funds to improve the other spouse's property,
or separate funds to improve the community property, the possibility that the contribution was in-
tended as a gift arises. The circumstances surrounding the contribution must be examined to deter-
mine if a gift was intended. Cross, supra note 21, at 777-79. See also, e.g., In re Hart's Estate, 149
Wash. 600, 271 P. 886 (1928); In re Carmack's Estate, 133 Wash. 374, 233 P. 942 (1925).
24. Merkel v. Merkel, 39 Wn. 2d 102, 234 P.2d 857 (1951). In Merkel, community earnings
were used to make mortgage payments on the husband's separately owned farmland. The community
had a right to reimbursement only to the extent that community funds were used to pay the mortgage
principal. The court reasoned "that interest, tax and upkeep payments made by the community repre-
sent no more than reasonable rental for the use of the land." Id. at 116,234 P.2d at 864.
25. Pekola v. Strand, 25 Wn. 2d 98, 101-02, 168 P.2d 407,409 (1946).
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been measured as the actual amount contributed to the improved estate. 26
This contributed amount is characterized as a loan or advancement to the
improved estate. 27 Interest on this amount may be included at the court's
discretion. 28
The amount of reimbursement has also been measured as the increase
in property value directly attributable to the improvement. 29 This mea-
surement is useful, for example, in situations where it is difficult to deter-
mine the actual amount contributed to the improved estate, such as when
labor rather than money has been contributed. Such a measurement is not
analogous to a loan or advancement because it bears no necessary relation
to the actual amount contributed. 30 It has not been clearly indicated, how-
ever, whether this measurement is to be made at the time of the contribu-
tion or at the settling of the estates. 31
Regardless of the measurement used, the right to reimbursement tradi-
26. Id. The Pekola court stated that "implicit in our decision is the rule that an equitable lien may
be claimed by the community for improvements upon the separate property of a spouse to the extent
only that community funds are invested." Id. at 102, 168 P.2d at 409. See also In re Marriage of
Johnson, 28 Wn. App. 574, 625 P.2d 720 (1981); In re Estate of Trierweiler, 5 Wn. App. 17, 486
P.2d 314 (1971). In a mortgage situation, the value of the right to reimbursement is the amount of the
expenditure used to discharge the mortgage principal. Merkel v. Merkel, 39 Wn. 2d 102, 116, 234
P.2d 857, 864 (1951); In re Marriage of Harshman, 18 Wn. App. 116, 123, 567 P.2d 667, 671-72
(1977).
27. Cross, supra note 21, at776.
28. Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn. 2d 355, 110 P.2d 172 (1941). The court in Conley, discussing Legg
v. Legg, 34 Wash. 132, 75 P. 130 (1904), suggested that when the equities of the case demand it, the
lien should equal the value of the improvements "together with interest on the amount thus ascer-
tained by the court." Conley, 7 Wn. 2d at 361, 110 P.2d at 174.
Because the profits from separate property are separate property in Washington, it has been sug-
gested that allowing the contributing community an interest factor on the "loan" would compensate
the community for a "lost investment." W. REPPY & C. SAMUEL, supra note 19, at 107-08. Profes-
sor Cross reasons, however, that, while an interest factor is conceivable, equitably it would often be
unnecessary, as the contributing estate generally will derive some offsetting benefit from the im-
proved property. Cross, supra note 21, at 780.
29. Baker v. Baker, 80 Wn. 2d 736, 498 P.2d 315 (1972).
30. Such a valuation scheme is not a certain means of reimbursement, however. It is conceivable
that some expenditures may not enhance the property value to the extent of funds used, while others
may greatly enhance the value. Valuing the right to reimbursement at the enhanced property value
consequently entitles some contributing estates to a substantial return on their contribution, while
denying others full reimbursement. Results may be more consistent when the right is valued at the
amount expended, with a possible interest factor when equity demands.
31. In Baker v. Baker, 80 Wn. 2d 736, 745, 498 P.2d 315, 320-21 (1972), the right to reim-
bursement was measured as the increase in property value attributable to the improvement at the
settling of the estates. The court did not indicate why it chose to measure the increase at that time
rather than at the time of contribution. The court cited Burch v. Rice, 37 Wn. 2d 185, 222 P.2d 847
(1950), for authority. The Burch case had stated that when the community makes improvements on
the separate property that enhances the value of the separate property, it is entitled to a lien on the
separate property to the extent of the improvement. The court did not, however, indicate whether the
measurement was to be made at the time the improvement was made, or when the estates were set-
tled. Thus, there is no clear indication of the time at which measurement is to be made.
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tionally has not included a proportional share in the inflationary increase
in the value of the improved asset. 32 The inflationary increase in the value
of an asset is a part of the asset itself. 33 As the contributing estate tradi-
tionally does not acquire an ownership interest in the asset, it likewise
does not acquire a share of the inflationary increase. Thus, the inflation-
ary increase in the value of separate property has been likened to "is-
sues" of such property and belongs to the separate estate. 34 The inflation-
ary increase in the value of community property similarly belongs to the
community.3 5
C. The Court of Appeals Controversy
Disagreement between three recent Washington Court of Appeals deci-
sions, representing all three divisions of the court, provides the immedi-
ate legal background for the Elam decision. 36 The controversy stemmed
from a misinterpretation of dicta in Hamlin v. Merlino37 in which the
court stated:
32. Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn. 2d 355, 363, 110 P.2d 172, 175 (1941); Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash.
340, 348, 115 P. 731,734 (1911).
33. In re Marriage of Johnson, 28 Wn. App. 574, 576, 625 P.2d 720, 720-21 (198 1).
34. Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash. 340, 115 P. 731 (19 11). The Guye court stated: "Since by the
statute the spouse owning separate property is entitled to the rents, issues and profits thereof, so such
owner must be entitled to the natural increase in value, as such increase is as much the issue of such
property as would be the rents derived therefrom." Id. at 348, 115 P. at 734. This reasoning was
reiterated in Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn. 2d 355, 110 P.2d 172 (1941). The Conley court recognized that
although the community had a lien on the separate property for improvements built with community
funds, it had no similar interest in the natural enhancement, all of which attached to the separate
property. Id. at 363, 110 P.2d at 175.
This result has been criticized as denying the contributing estate a fair return on its contribution.
See Bartke, supra note 21, at 400. Professor Bartke reasoned that valuing the reimbursement right as
the amount of the expenditure would be unfair to the contributing estate if the value of the property
increased, and unfair to the improved estate if the value of the property decreased. He suggested:
If the court would treat such expenditures as an equity investment of community funds, rather
than a loan, the community would share in the fluctuations of the market, taking both the gains
and the losses. In view of the inflationary forces at work in the economy at present, tying the
recovery to the amount of the expenditure in each case seems grossly unfair to the community.
Id. See also McCoy v. Ware, 25 Wn. App. 648, 651, 608 P.2d 1268, 1269-70 (1980) (Roe, J.,
concurring).
35. The inflationary increase of community property attaches to the community property itself.
As this increase is not the separate property of either spouse, it is properly characterized as property
acquired during marriage that is community property pursuant to WASH. REV CODE § 26.16.030
(1983).
36. In re Marriage of Johnson, 28 Wn. App. 574, 625 P.2d 720 (1981) (Division Two); McCoy
v. Ware, 25 Wn. App. 648, 608 P.2d 1268 (1980) (Division Three); In re Marriage of Harshman, 18
Wn. App. 116, 567 P.2d 667 (1977) (Division One). The several divisions of the court differed as to
the proper characterization of the increase in value of separate property during marriage and the
proper valuation of the right to reimbursment.
37. 44Wn. 2d851,272P.2d 125(1954).
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[W]here the separate property in question is real estate or an unincorpo-
rated business with which personal services ostensibly belonging to the
community have been combined, the rule is that all the income or increase
will be considered as community property in the absence of a contempo-
raneous segregation of the income between the community and the separate
estates.38
Relying on this statement, the court in In re Marriage of Harshman39 held
that when the value of separate property increases during marriage, there
is a presumption that the increase is community property. The owner of
the separate property can overcome this presumption by clear and con-
vincing evidence tracing the increase to the separate property, or by evi-
dence of contemporaneous segregation of the increase as it arises. 40
The Harshman community presumption was accepted in McCoy v.
Ware.41 The McCoy court stated that when separate real estate is im-
proved by community services or funds, any increase in value is pre-
sumptively community property "to the extent that the community has a
lien against the property to secure reimbursement for the increased
value." 42 Thus, the McCoy court required that the party asserting that the
increase is separate property assume the burden of proving that the in-
creased value of the separate property was due to a cause other than the
community contribution. 43 The court stated that evidence that the in-
crease is due to inflation can rebut the community property presumption.
The court in In re Marriage of Johnson44 questioned the Harshman-
McCoy community presumption. 45 The Johnson court found that the
Harshman rule had developed from a misapplication of the Hamlin v.
Merlino contemporaneous segregation rule46 and that the Harshman rule
38. Id. at 858,272 P.2d at 129.
39. 18 Wn. App. 116, 567 P.2d 667 (1977). In Harshman, community funds were expended on
the husband's separate property. The value of the property increased $23,000 during the marriage.
40. Id. at 125-26, 567 P.2d at 673. The Elam court disagreed with this result. See infra notes
51-54 and accompanying text.
41. 25 Wn. App. 648, 608 P.2d 1268 (1980). In McCoy, community funds were used to main-
tain and improve the wife's home and to retire the mortgage on the home. The trial court had allowed
reimbursement to the community for the mortgage payments but had denied the request for a commu-
nity lien for the increased value of the home because the community had not established that the
increase in value was due to improvements by the community rather than to inflation. Id. at 649-50,
608 P.2d at 1269.
42. Id. at 650, 608 P.2d at 1269. The Elam court disagreed with this result. See infra notes
51-54 and accompanying text.
43. 25 Wn. App. at 650,608 P.2d at 1269.
44. 28 Wn. App. 574, 625 P.2d 720(1981).
45. The Johnson case involved a separately owned home with a $400 community improvement.
The house had increased in value during the marriage by over $10,000. Id. at 575, 625 P.2d at 720.
The trial court characterized the entire inflationary increase in value as community property, relying
on the Harshman presumption. Id. at 577, 625 P.2d at 721. The Johnson court reversed.
46. Id. at 577-78, 625 P.2d at 721-22. The Hamlin v. Merlino rule of contemporaneous segrega-
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was contrary to Washington precedent. 47 The court indicated that the in-
flationary increase in the value of separate property is properly character-
ized as separate.
Thus, the immediate background for the Elam case was a direct split in
the divisions of the court of appeals over whether the increase in the value
of separate property during marriage is presumptively separate property
or community property, and which estate has the burden of proof.
II. THE ELAM COURT'S REASONING
The issue certified to the Elam court was "[t]o what extent, if any, is
there a community interest in the increase in value of separate property
due to inflation, where community funds and labor were used to improve
the property?" 48 The court commented that, had there been no commu-
nity contributions, the inflationary increase in the value of the separate
property would be entirely separate. 49 The court held, however, that
when community contributions are made, "the community should be en-
titled to a share of the increase in value due to inflation in proportion to
the value of community contributions to the property." 50
The court reviewed the Harshman, McCoy, and Johnson decisions and
found that both the Harshman and McCoy courts erred in holding that any
tion dealt with the commingling of separate property income with income from community labor.
The resulting income cannot be characterized absent proof of its source. Segregating the income
proportionately to its sources as it arises is a means of establishing its character. The rule stated that
absent segregation the income is presumed to be community property. Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wn. 2d
851,858, 272 P.2d 125, 129 (1954).
The Hamlin rule stated only that when community labor and separate property income have been
commingled such that any increase from them cannot be traced, that increase is presumptively com-
munity property absent contemporaneous segregation of the income to its source as it arises. The
Harshman and McCoy courts misapplied the Hamlin decision, as commingling was not an issue in
those cases. The Harshman and McCoy courts also misread Hamlin by applying the community pre-
sumption to any increase in the value of separate property, regardless of its source. See infra text
accompanying notes 51-54.
47. The Johnson court stated:
The Harshman-McCoy rule, which places the burden of proof on the separate property-owning
spouse to disprove that an investment of community funds or labor produced the increase in
value, appears to run counter to established precedent in this state. The principle is well estab-
lished that one seeking a community interest in separate property must overcome the presump-
tion to the contrary.
In re Marriage of Johnson. 28 Wn. App. 574, 578-79, 625 P.2d 720,722 (1981) (citations omitted).
48. In re Marriage of Elam, 97 Wn. 2d 811,812,650 P.2d 213,214 (1982).
49. Id. at 813,650 P.2d at 214.
50. Id. at 817. 650 P.2d at 216. The court supported this result only by citing Judge Roe's con-
curring opinion in McCoy v. Ware, 25 Wn. App. 648, 651, 608 P.2d 1268. 1269-70 (1980). Judge
Roe urged the adoption of a stance that would allow the contributing estate to share in the present
value of the improved property. Such a stance would require that the contributing estate purchase an
ownership share in the improved property. See infra note 58.
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increase in the value of separate property during marriage is presump-
tively community property. 51 According to the Elam court, the Harshman
and McCoy courts misread the contemporaneous segregation dicta of
Hamlin v. Merlino,52 incorrectly applying the community property pre-
sumption to any increase in the value of separate property, regardless of
its source. 53 Like the Johnson court, the Elam court concluded that such a
presumption is inconsistent with prior case law. 54
The Elam court instead held that any increase in the value of separate
property is presumptively separate. The party asserting that it is commu-
nity property can rebut this presumption with evidence attributing the in-
crease to community contributions of labor or funds. The separate prop-
erty-owning spouse is entitled to all of the increased value of the separate
property "except to the extent to which the other spouse can show that the
increase was attributable to community contributions." 55
III. ANALYSIS
It is well established in Washington law that once property is shown to
be separate, it is presumed to retain that character until it can no longer be
traced or until the presumption is overcome by rebutting evidence. 56
Therefore, the Elam court properly held that each spouse is entitled to the
increase in value of his or her separate property, except to the extent to
which the other spouse can prove the increase was due to community con-
tributions .57
The court did not, however, explain why the community was entitled
to a share of the inflationary increase in the value of the separate property.
By granting the community a share of the inflationary increase, the court
51. In reMarriage ofElam, 97 Wn. 2d 811, 816,650 P.2d213,216(1982).
52. 44 Wn. 2d 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954). The court held in Hamlin that when separate property
and community labor are commingled to increase the value of the separate property or to create
profits, the increase is presumed to be community property absent contemporaneous segregation of
the income according to its source. See supra note 46.
53. In re Marriage of Elam, 97 Wn. 2d 811, 816, 650 P.2d 213,216 (1982).
54. Id.
55. Id. The disagreement in the court of appeals divisions was only over this presumption ques-
tion-the divisions did not reach the question of whether the community should share in the inflation-
ary increase in the value of separate property. Yet the Elam court gave no indication how this separate
property presumption could lead it to summarily characterize a portion of the inflated value of the
separate property as belonging to the community.
56. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
57. The Elam court valued the community's right to reimbursement as the increase in value of
the separate property directly attributable to the improvement. 97 Wn. 2d 811, 816, 650 P.2d 213,
216 (1982). This is consistent with the rule of valuation used in Baker v. Baker, 80 Wn. 2d 736, 498
P.2d 315 (1972). Arguably a more consistent measure of the value of the right is the actual amount of
the expenditure. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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appears to have ignored established case law and shifted from a theory of
reimbursement to a share-of-ownership theory. 58 But it is not clear that an
ownership theory was actually adopted by the court; it is probable that the
reimbursement theory has been retained. This raises questions about the
proper application of the Elam decision to future cases. 59
A. Conflict with Prior Law
By granting the community estate a share of the inflationary increase,
the Elam decision conflicts with the theory of reimbursement established
in prior case law. In Guye v. Guye, 60 the Washington Supreme Court held
that the inflationary increase in the value of separate property is separate
property. 6' According to the Elam court, however, the rule is different if
funds or services of the community have been contributed. 62
Under the analysis prior to Elam, the inflationary increase in the value
of separate property inures to the separate property regardless of whether
community funds have been contributed. 63 Inflationary or deflationary
fluctuations in the property value are simply incidents of ownership.
Thus, the contributing estate has been entitled to a share of the inflation-
ary increase only if it purchased an ownership share of the property.
58. An ownership theory treats the contributing estate as having "bought in" to a share of the
present market value of the property. Any inflationary increase in the property attaches proportion-
ately to the ownership interests, giving the contributing estate a beneficial return on its "invest-
ment." Implicit in this theory is the corresponding loss which will attach proportionately to the own-
ership interests due to deflationary decreases in the property value. Thus, while a reimbursement
theory entitles the contributing estate to reimbursement for its contribution regardless of the changes
in property value, an ownership theory makes any return to the contributing estate dependent upon
market fluctuations.
59. There is a second problem in the court's reasoning as well. The Elam decision does not
clearly indicate how the right to reimbursement is to be measured. While the court stated that the
community is entitled to reimbursement to the extent that the contribution increased the value of the
improved estate, the court then assumed that this increased value equaled the amount of the contribu-
tion. In so doing the court confused two distinct approaches to reimbursement measurement.
Both approaches to reimbursement measurement have been used in prior Washington cases. In
some cases, courts have treated the contribution as a loan to the improved estate and fixed reimburse-
ment as the amount expended. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. In other cases, courts
have fixed reimbursement as the value added to the improved property. See supra note 39 and accom-
panying text. In few cases would these amounts be equal. The cost of an improvement generally is
distinct from the effect the improvement has on the value of improved property.
Because the Elam court equated the cost of contribution with the consequences of contribution
there is no indication which approach to reimbursement is preferable. The Elam decision provides no
guidance.
60. 63 Wash. 340, 115 P. 731 (1911).
61. The Elam court agreed that if no community funds or services have been contributed to the
separate property, the inflationary increase in the value of the property is entirely separate. In re
Marriage of Elam, 97 Wn. 2d 811,813,650 P.2d 213, 214 (1982).
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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Under Washington law, however, the contributing estate acquires no
ownership interest in the improved property. It can only claim reimburse-
ment. 64 By holding that the community is entitled to a share of the in-
flationary increase, the Elam court appears to have shifted to a share-of-
ownership result without expressly adopting a share-of-ownership theory.
The court did not explain how it reached this result. The only clue to
the court's reasoning is its citation of Judge Roe's concurring opinion in
McCoy v. Ware.65 Judge Roe stated that mere reimbursement does not
provide a realistic return of the purchasing power of the money invested
when inflation is high. He suggested that the community should propor-
tionately share in the present value of the property, whether it is inflated
or deflated. 66 This result is consistent with a share-of-ownership theory. 67
The question thus arises whether the Elam court was adopting a share-of-
ownership theory or merely Judge Roe's result.
Two aspects of the case indicate that the Elam court adopted only
Judge Roe's result and that the reimbursement theory still prevails. First,
though the court's result is inconsistent with well-established case law,
the court did not overrule this prior law. Second, the court cited several
cases which characterize the community's interest as a right to reimburse-
ment rather than an ownership interest. 68 Having never discussed this as-
pect of these cases, the court impliedly accepted a right to reimbursement
as the correct characterization of the community's interest. Moreover,
Mr. Elam's award, which included a refund for contributions to his wife's
separate property and which was protected by an equitable lien on his
wife's house, 69 is consistent with the court's implied acceptance of a re-
imbursement theory. Thus, the court has apparently retained the reim-
bursement theory, but has reached a share-of-ownership result.
B. Problems of Application
The future application of the Elam result is complicated by the absence
of any detailed explanation of the nature of property interests in inflation-
ary increases. Under the reimbursement theory, there is no theoretical
64. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
65. 25 Wn. App. 645, 651,608 P.2d 1268, 1269 (1980).
66. Id. at 651, 608 P.2d at 1270.
67. See supra note 58.
68. In re Marriage of Elam, 97 Wn. 2d 811, 815, 650 P.2d 213, 215 (1982). The Elam court
cited In re Marriage of Harshman, 18 Wn. App. 116, 126, 567 P.2d 667, 673 (1977), which states
that "the community would be entitled to an equitable lien or right of reimbursement as to the in-
creased value," and McCoy v. Ware, 25 Wn. App. 648, 650, 608 P.2d 1268, 1269 (1980), which
states that "the community has a lien against the property to secure reimbursement for the increased
value."
69. In re Marriage of Elam, 97Wn. 2d 811, 817, 650 P.2d 213, 216(1982).
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basis for the existence of an inflationary share. Since the court did not
indicate how such a share arose, there are no guidelines for the applica-
tion of the Elam result to other cases.
For example, since the right to reimbursement is an equitable right, it
does not arise in all cases. Likewise, in some cases it may be diminished
if the contributing estate derives some benefit from the improved asset. 70
Whether the inflationary share will also be subject to such equitable ad-
justments is uncertain. If the inflationary "entitlement" attaches to the
right to reimbursement, it will exist only when, and to the extent that, the
right exists. On the other hand, if it attaches to the contribution itself, it
should be available even if the equitable right to reimbursement is not.
The Elam decision does not offer sufficient analysis to enable a court to
calculate the inflationary share in such a case.
Additionally, the Elam holding provides no guidelines for the calcula-
tion of the share in a deflationary situation. Under a share-of-ownership
theory the contributing estate not only enjoys the benefit of inflation, but
must also bear the cost of deflation. Under a reimbursement theory, how-
ever, the contributing estate is entitled to reimbursement for its contribu-
tion regardless of whether the value of the improved property is inflated
or deflated. 71 In Elam, the court used a two-step formula for the calcula-
tion of the contributing estate's interest. 72 The court first calculated Mr.
Elam's right to reimbursement and then calculated an additional share of
the inflationary increase. Presumably in a deflationary situation the court
would also first calculate the right to reimbursement. The court gave no
indication, however, that it would be willing to subtract the cost of defla-
tion from this reimbursement share. Thus, there is no indication whether
the court will reach a share-of-ownership result or a reimbursement result
in a deflationary situation.
Finally, there is no indication whether Elam will apply to mortgage
repayment situations as well as to improvement situations and, if so, to
what extent. Will the inflationary share be proportional to the contributing
estate's contribution to the entire mortgage payment, or only to the extent
that the contribution goes to pay the mortgage principal?
These situations arise frequently and must be considered in order for
the Elam result to be generally applicable.
C. A More Flexible Approach
The Elam result is an attractive one. Considerable sums can be contrib-
70. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
71. The measure of reimbursement is of course subject to equitable adjustment. See id.
72. See supra note 10.
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uted over a long period of time by one estate to another during a marriage.
Granting the contributing estate a share of the inflationary increase of the
improved property is, during times of high inflation, a more realistic re-
turn in terms of the purchasing power of the money invested than is a
simple "repayment" of a loan. In reaching this equitable result, how-
ever, the court did not clearly indicate the proper measure of the right to
reimbursement. The court also shifted to a share-of-ownership.result with
no comparable shift in the underlying theory. This result is theoretically
unsound and is therefore of no value for predicting results in factual situa-
tions that differ from that in Elam.
The Elam court, however, could have reached a comparable result con-
sistent with the reimbursement theory. The measure of reimbursement
may be fixed as (1) the amount of the contribution, (2) the amount by
which the improvement has increased the value of the asset at the time of
the contribution, or (3) the amount by which the improvement has in-
creased the value of the asset at the time of the controversy. 73 Under all
three of these approaches the equitable result sought by the Elam court
may be obtained. Equally important, each approach is consistent with
Washington case law.
If the right to reimbursement is measured as the cost of the contribu-
tion, it is analogous to a loan or advancement to the improved estate. As
with ordinary loans, interest on this contribution should be available to
the "lending" estate. 74 Adding a high interest factor may not yield a
monetary result equivalent to the Elam two-step calculation. 75 However,
this approach is predictable, easily administered, and consistent with
Washington case law.
Likewise, an equitable adjustment can be added if the right to reim-
bursement is measured as the increase in value of the improved property
attributable to the contribution at the time of the contribution. Though this
measure of the right to reimbursement is not analogous to a loan, 76 some
adjustment is proper to compensate the contributing estate for the lost use
of capital contributed to the improved estate. Such an adjustment would
also be comparable to the result reached by the Elam court.
Both of these approaches are more certain than that adopted by the
Elam court because neither approach violates existing theory, and neither
poses the difficult application problems inherent in the Elam approach. In
either an interest or adjustment approach, the entitlement to interest is
73. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
74. The availability of interest when equity demands was first suggested in Conley v. Moe, 7
Wn. 2d 355, 110 P.2d 172 (1941).
75. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 27-28 and accompanying text.
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equitable as is the right to reimbursement and thus can be allowed or dis-
allowed as equity demands. For example, an interest factor would often
be equitably unnecessary as the contributing estate usually derives an
offsetting benefit from the use of the improved property. 77 In such a case,
the interest factor need not arise as it is an equitable right only, not an
unalterable entitlement.
In improvement situations, the easiest and most flexible means of
reaching the Elam result may be to measure the right to reimbursement
under the third approach-as the amount by which the improvement has
increased the value of the asset at the time of the controversy. Under this
approach inflation need not be treated as a separate "entitlement" as it
was in Elam. Rather, the inflation is included in the increased value of the
improved asset and is thus simply part of the measurement of the right to
reimbursement. This approach is consistent with Washington case law 78
and is the most flexible and equitable.
Such an approach is analogous to the contributing estate's ownership of
the improvement. 79 The contributing estate would benefit from inflation-
ary increases in the value of the improvement. It would likewise bear the
loss of deflationary decreases in its value, and possible loss of the im-
provement itself. The measurement of the right to reimbursement would
thus be self-adjusting as the market fluctuates, and equitable adjustments
would not be necessary.
77. Cross, supra note 21, at 780.
78. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 80 Wn. 2d 736, 498 P.2d 315 (1972); Burch v. Rice, 37 Wn. 2d
185, 222 P.2d 847 (1950).
79. Under this approach, fluctuations in value attendant upon inflation and deflation attach to the
contribution itself, not to the total value of the improved property. This approach is therefore differ-
ent than a share-of-ownership approach.
Assume, for example, that at the time of marriage one spouse owned 100 acres of farmland worth
$500 per acre, or $50,000. After marriage, the community constructed a building on the land worth
$10,000, making the total value of the property $60,000. During the marriage, the building increased
in value five times due to inflation, and at dissolution was worth $50,000. The land, however, in-
creased in value 20 times, and at dissolution was worth $10,000 per acre, or $1 million.
Under a share-of-ownership approach, the community would have purchased a one-sixth share of
the improved property at the time of its contribution. At dissolution, the community would thus own
one-sixth of the total value of the improved property, or $175,000. Under a reimbursement approach,
however, the community would be entitled only to reimbursement for its contribution. If reimburse-
ment is measured as the amount by which the improvement has increased the value of the asset at the
time of dissolution, the community would be entitled to $50,000.
The reimbursement and share-of-ownership approaches are different for other reasons as well.
Under the reimbursement theory, the contributing estate does not acquire an ownership interest in the
improved property; thus the separate estate retains all the rights of ownership incident to the property.
For example, the separate estate can dispose of or encumber the property without joinder of the
contributing estate. The separate estate also owns all the rents, issues, and profits of the property.
Under an ownership approach, however, the separate estate must share these incidents of ownership
proportionately with the contributing estate.
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Thus, under all three methods of measuring the right to reimbursement,
an equitable result comparable to the Elam result can be reached which is
consistent with the Washington theory of reimbursement. All three meth-
ods are more flexible than the Elam approach. Under the interest and ad-
justment approaches the equitable adjustments to the measurement can be
made on a case-by-case basis, as is necessary to adequately compensate
the contributing estate. Under the "ownership of the improvement" ap-
proach the measurement would be self-adjusting.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Elam decision provides no guidance for future cases involving the
settling of community and separate estates when contributions have been
made by one estate to improve the other during marriage. The Elam court
granted the community estate a proportionate share in the inflationary in-
crease of the separate property, a result inconsistent with prior Washing-
ton case law and reimbursement theory. While the court's result is equita-
ble and desirable in times of high inflation, the court's decision will be
difficult to apply in future cases due to the court's failure to justify the
existence of an inflationary share within the principles of the reimburse-
ment theory. 80
The first step necessary to resolve this problem is to indicate precisely
which measurement approach is to be used in measuring the right to reim-
bursement: (1) the amount of contribution, (2) the amount by which the
improvement has increased the value of the asset, measured at the time of
the contribution, or (3) the amount by which the improvement has in-
creased the value of the asset, measured at the time of the settling of the
estates. Under each approach, inflation, or an adjustment comparable to
inflation, is available. Each approach is consistent with the Washington
reimbursement theory. Thus, the equitable result sought in the Elam case
can be obtained within existing Washington law, without the problems of
application inherent in the Elam approach.
Elizabeth Lacalli Wallin
80. Actually the decision poses two problems in its application to future cases. The first is its
inclusion of a share of inflationary increase. The second is its failure to indicate the proper way to
measure the right to reimbursement-whether it is to be measured as the cost of contribution or as the
increased value of the improved asset due to the improvement. See supra note 59. This is a basic
problem that must be resolved to give guidance to other courts in properly measuring the right to
reimbursement.
355
